One Step Forward,Two Steps Back

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

SYMBIOTIC SPIES

Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, by Michael S. Goodman. Stanford University Press, 2007. 295 pages, $50.     

VERIFIABILITY,RELIABILITY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate in October 1999 could have been avoided, and the consequences of that vote still loom in the minds of supporters of the treaty. President Barack Obama has embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and a key element of the Obama administration's arms control agenda is delivering on U.S. CTBT ratification. In order to secure the two-thirds majority in the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty, senators that remain skeptical of nuclear disarmament must also be convinced that the entry into force of the CTBT is in the national security interest of the United States. This article provides an analysis of the issues surrounding U.S. CTBT ratification divided into three segments—verifiability of the treaty, reliability of the U.S. stockpile, and the treaty's impact on U.S. national security—and concludes that CTBT ratification serves the security objectives of the United States. The CTBT constitutes an integral component of the multilateral nonproliferation architecture designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it constrains the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, thereby hindering efforts by states of concern to develop advanced nuclear weapons.     

美国国防太空力量发展的动向及应对 ——基于对美国2020年《国防太空战略》的解读

发展国防太空力量是美国谋划大国竞争的战略支点。特朗普政府执政以来,为捍卫一超独霸的太空地位,加速推进太空军事化进程,已制定《国家太空战略》,签署新的太空政策指令,成立第六军种“天军”。2020年6月,美国公开最新版《国防太空战略》报告。本文对其梳理分析以研判美国国防太空力量发展动向,并运用网络调研法搜集近年美国政府部门关于国防太空力量发展的权威政策文本及知名智库的深度研究报告。在此基础上,把美国2020年最新版《国防太空战略》作为中心文本,以文献分析法归纳美国国防太空力量发展的动因、目标及行动计划。中国作为负责任的发展中太空大国,应当积极借鉴并应对美国2020年《国防太空战略》：内强素质,提升国防太空军事技术硬实力;外树形象,在国际场合积极推动太空和平利用的政策议程。     

Regaining Strategy: Small Powers,Strategic Culture,and Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.     

‘It isn’t over until the fuel cell sings’: A reassessment of the US and French pledges of nuclear assistance in the 1970s

Based on newly declassified archival documents, the aim of this study is to contribute to an improved understanding of the evolution of the non-proliferation regime through an examination of US and French nuclear cooperation agreements in the latter half of the 1970s. The four pledges of nuclear assistance examined – US assistance to Egypt and Israel, and French assistance to Pakistan and South Korea – failed to materialise by the end of the decade. Why did that happen? What caused the four pledges to fail? We find that the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and the emergence of opposing domestic factions on the nuclear front in the supplier states generated major changes in US and French nuclear export policies, and also contributed to the development of a collaborative partnership between the two competing nuclear exporters, on the other.     

美国网络空间作战能力建设

网络空间越来越被世界各国公认为是继陆地、海洋、空中和太空之后的第五个作战域,为获得和保持像其它作战域那样世界领先的军事优势,美国正在大力进行网络空间作战能力建设。提出了美国网络空间作战能力建设框架,从战略规划、作战力量、作战理论、作战训练、武器装备、战场基础环境、人才培养和作战联盟八个方面全面总结了美国近年来在网络空间作战能力建设方面的主要做法。     

Geopolitics over Proliferation: the Origins of US Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

How much does the United States care about nonproliferation? Recent scholarship suggests that the fear of spreading nuclear weapons was central to the US grand strategy in the Cold War. In one important case, however, this argument does not hold. This article draws on theoretical debates and newly declassified archives to demonstrate the primacy of geopolitics over nonproliferation in Washington’s policy toward India and Pakistan. Despite their rhetoric, Democratic and Republican leaders consistently relegated nonproliferation to the backburner whenever it conflicted with other strategic goals. Moreover, they inadvertently encouraged proliferation in South Asia at three inter-connected levels: technology, security, and identity.     

Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder

This article argues for the continued relevance of the work and theories of the British Geostrategist Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947). It asserts that commentators and scholars who seek to marginalise Mackinder have too often dismissed his theories without setting them in the context of their continued endorsement in crucial areas of the globe. After 1945, despite his theories being tainted by association with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, both Moscow and Washington recognised the utility of Mackinder’s work and tailored policy accordingly. The end of Cold War saw Mackinder fall out of favour as his model was deemed unsuitable for policy analysis by a number of influential thinkers. It is argued here that, in recent years, the arena of international politics has seen a rehabilitation of Mackinder, accompanied by a resurgence of interest in Geopolitics. Finally, the piece examines those areas of the contemporary globe where Mackinder’s influence is greatest.